Decision makers, both public and private, use forecasts of economic growth and inflation to make plans and implement policies. In many situations, reasonally good forecasts can be made with simple rules of thumb that are extrapolations of a single data series. In principle, information about other economic indicators should be useful in forecasting a particular series like inflation or output. Including too many variables makes a model unwieldy and not including enough can increase forecast error. An important problem is deciding which other series to include. Recently, studies have shown that Dynamic Factor Models (DFMs) may provide a general solution to this problem. The intuition is that these models use a large data set to extract a few common factors (thus, the term 'data-rich').
In this paper, we use DFM forecasts of inflation and the real economy with three alternative processes: (1) A benchmark autoregressive model; (2) a random walk; and (3) a constant that presumes a fixed rate of growth of prices and output over the forecast horizon. The first part of the paper describes the data-rich forecasting process we employ. The second part of the paper briefly reviews the forecasting literature that is relevant to this paper. We conclude by offering some evidence that forecasts of inflation using a data-rich framework are more accurate than a simple autoregressive model or a random walk. But also, forecasts that assume an arbitrarily assumed inflation target of 2 percent are also more accurate over the past decade.
Whether forecasting with simple rules or data-rich methods, we find that there is a significant reduction in uncertainty about inflation as the forecast horizon lengthens.
Brief Introduction to the Data-Rich Environment
Many researchers, including Stock and Watson (1999) and Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) , have promoted the idea that dynamic factor models (DFMs) can be used to improve empirical macroeconomic analysis. In making monetary policy, central bankers focus on forecasts of output and inflation, but they look at many time series when making forecasts. According to Chairman Bernanke:
I think there's no substitute for looking at a wide variety of indicators. In particular, what does it mean when the Fed says that policy actions are going to be dependent on data? What that means, to my mind, is that as new data come in, we need to think about not just the number itself in some sense, but what is the implication for the long-term forecast, or the medium-term forecast? When we see numbers from the labor market or from inflation, how does that revise our views of where the economy is likely to be in the next six, 12, and 18 months? After all, monetary policy works with a lag, and so the only reasonable way to make policy is to think about the actions that have been taken so far, look at the state of the economy, and try to make an assessment as to where the economy's going to be a year down the road. So, the key statistic in some sense is the forecast.
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Dynamic Factor Models use a large data set to extract a few fundamental factors. Here, a fundamental factor is one that affects all variables in the economy. Each macro time series is assumed to be driven by a small number of fundamental factors and an idiosyncratic component.
Stock and Watson have focused on forecasting problems. Bernanke has focused on applied policy models (structural VARs). The DFM has gained popularity for two important reasons.
First, augmenting VARs with dynamic factors appears to be a solution to omitted variable bias in structural vector autoregression models (SVARs). When Bernanke (1986) presented his first SVAR models at a Carnegie-Rochester Public Policy Conference, King (1986) commented on the paper, noting that omitting any important macro variable from the policymaker's information set would result in incorrect inference about the effects of monetary policy. In small dimension VARs, important variables are likely to be omitted. Forni et al. (2000) and Forni et al. (2005) show that if one had a large number of variables driven by a small number of fundamental factors, then just a few lags of the fundamental factors contain approximately the same the information that could be found in an infinite lag of just a small number of variables. Both Stock and Watson (1999) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) approximate the solution to the dynamic factor model in a two-stage process by using a few lags a small number of the largest principal components (which are estimated in the first stage) in estimating their forecasting and policy models (the second stage).
The second reason the DFM has become popular is because it provides an empirical framework for doing empirical analysis that is consistent with the stochastic nature of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. DSGE models determine a large number of variables with just a small number of fundamental shocks. A few shocks to preferences, technology and policy drive all the macro variables. The empirical framework fits nicely with the theoretical framework. Recent papers by Evans and Marshall (2005) and by Boivin and Giannoni (2006) use the DFM technology with theory from DSGE models to identify structural shocks. Stock and Watson (2003) use financial variables like term spreads, default spreads and stock prices to forecast output and inflation. They argue that asset prices do a better job of predicting output than inflation. They also included a brief survey of nonfinancial variables used to forecast inflation, focusing mostly on Phillips curve specifications that use output gaps or the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). They assert that Phillips curve models are unreliable because of the time varying nature of inflation and, as argued in Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Rudd and Whelan (2005) , they do not perform as well as naïve (random walk) forecasts. Stock and Watson conclude that in most cases a combination of forecasts that are based on individual indicators (using a trimmed mean framework) outperforms a naïve forecast.
In a subsequent paper, Stock and Watson (2005) argue that inflation has become easier to forecast owing to a reduction in the variance of its permanent component. They attribute this in part to the "Great Moderation," a term for the reduction in output volatility since about 1984. If this moderation is the result of "good luck," or favorable shocks, rather than a permanent development, then forecasters may find it much more difficult to forecast output and inflation should a period of adverse shocks arise.
2 Stock and Watson also argue that a random walk model outperforms an autoregressive and Phillips curve inflation forecasts during the period since 1984. Stock and Watson (1999) show that a dynamic factor model with one factor (constructed using either a very large data set of 152 variables or a smaller set of 61 real variables) predicts inflation better than standard Phillips curve model including the unemployment rate. In a more recent paper Stock and Watson (2005) show that a simple random walk model of inflation appears to work as well as these more complicated models. In this paper, we compare two modified versions of the DFMs used by Stock and Watson (1999) with three simple rules for forecasting inflation.
Forecasting Inflation with DFMs
We compare forecasts of four price indexes-the CPI, the CPI excluding food and energy, the PCE chain price index and the PCE measure excluding food and energy. We use a monthly data set beginning in January 1978. We begin our pseudo out-of-sample forecasting experiment in January 1997 using models that are estimated using data available through December 1996 (we use current vintage data and assume counterfactually that all data are available in time to run the forecast). We reestimate the models (and the principal components) each month, producing recursive inflation forecasts through February 2006. The forecasting equations are presented in Table 1 .
• The first model is an autoregressive model with 12 monthly lags. For all models, the forecast horizon, h, is 3, 12 or 24 months. We use the same 12 lags for the various horizons and we do not check for the best in-sample fit for the lag length.
• The second model DFM(157) uses our full monthly data set of 157 variables to construct principal components. [See the Appendix for a listing of the entire data set by classification type.] The model adds n2 lags of the first n1 principal components to the AR model. For this memo, we run models with 1 to 4 lags of 1 to 5 principal components. If we included more than one principal component, then all the principal components enter the equation with the same lag length. The data set includes many real and nominal time series as well as many asset prices from the money, bond, equity and foreign exchange markets.
• The third model DFM (87) is the same as the second except that the principal components are calculated from a data set that includes only 87 real variables. It excludes the nominal variables and the asset prices.
• The fourth model is from Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) (AO) who show that a simple random walk model could predict the year-ahead inflation rate better than the standard Phillips Curve model. Stock and Watson (2005) show that this result is particular to the most recent period of stable inflation and that their DFM models (they used one with 152 variables and another with just 61 real variables) could do as well as AO even in the most recent period. All did better than the standard Phillips Curve model.
• The fifth model is based on our observation that where central bank's are perceived to have inflation targets, then people have come to use the perceived target as the forecast, especially for longer horizons. Here we assume that the perceived targets for both the CPI and the CPI excluding food and energy are 2.5% and the targets for the PCE chain price index and its core are 2.0%.
The RMSE of the inflation forecasts for the period from 1997 through early 2006 are shown in Table 2 . Several features of our results stand out. First, for the 3-month-ahead horizon, there is very little difference among the models, except perhaps in the case of the all-item CPI where the AR(12) and AO forecast are about 0.15% worse than the DFM and Target models. For the index that the Fed pays attention to-the core PCE chain price index, the difference between the best and worst forecast is only 0.03%. For the 12-month-ahead horizon and the core inflation measures, the models give very similar results, with an insignificant edge to the DFM models.
For the all item indexes, the target model is best and the random walk models are worst. At the 24-month horizon, the Target model is clearly best for the all item models, while the DFMs are best for the core measures, but the Target model performance is very close to them and better than the AO or AR(12) models.
In tables 3 and 4, we show which of the DFM models did best in out-of-sample forecasting. With all 157 time series included, the mode for the number of factors used was 1.
There were two instances of 4 factors and one instance with 5 factors. When we used only real data to compute the principal components, the mode was 2, in 8 of 12 cases. It is interesting to note that there was only a very small spread between the best and worst of the models with different lags and numbers of factors. For example, in the case of the core PCE price index, the difference was never as much as 0.07 percent for any horizon forecast. The largest spread (0.24%) was for the model forecasts of the core CPI using principle components of the 87 real variables. Figure 1 shows the forecasts of the core PCE price index from each of our models. The current results show how the different models performed over the last 5 years. All the data-based models lag when inflation trends change. It is interesting that in March 2006, the only model signaling concern about accelerating inflation was the 24-month-ahead forecast from the DFM(87) model, which uses only real variables in constructing the principal components.
The perceived inflation target (2 percent) has been a good forecast of inflation. One could not do significantly better using time series models. This is good news for the public because it means that they can trust that the Fed will do the right thing to achieve the perceived target. However, that does not help the policymaker know how to do the right thing.
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In this part of the paper, we repeat the forecasting exercise for four real variables listed in Table 5 . These variables are: (1) the index of coincident indicators; (2) the Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI); (3) real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); and (4) the civilian unemployment rate. 4 It is readily apparent from Table 5 that the AO (random walk) forecasts are generally inferior to the AR forecasts, and that the DFM models are generally superior to the AR forecasts for the real variables. If we assume that the coincident index is a reasonable proxy for monthly output, it is also apparent that the DFM (150) model has the lowest RMSE at any horizon, particularly at the 24-month horizon. For example, the percentage difference in the RMSE between the DFM(82) and DFM(15) to -8 percent at 12 months, to -12.5 percent at 24 months. As evident by comparing the CPI and PCE inflation forecasts in Table 2 with the CI forecasts in Table 6 , it is also the case that the RMSE for the inflation forecasts are lower than those for output growth. This is consistent with the work by, among others, McNees (1988) and Gavin and Mandal (2002) . Tables 6 and 7 show which models worked best in forecasting measures of real economic activity. Overall, the best models for the Coincident Indicator and the PMI were the ones that included the most factors with the longest lags. In all cases where such exteme models do best, further investigation of more factors and longer lags is warranted.
Conclusion
In the earlier forecasting literature using forecast data from 1976 to 1987 , McNees (1988 showed that uncertainty about the real economy fell by more than half as the forecast interval cumulated from 1 quarter to 8 quarters. Since then there has benn a sharp reduction in the size of the short-run forecast errors, but this reduction in volatility did not extend to longer horizons.
The size of the uncertainty about the real economy is now rather flat as we increase the interval over which we average real eocnomic activity. For inflation the results are more dramatic and much greater for long horizons than for short ones. Since monetary policy becomes more likely to be the main determinant of inflation as the horizon lengthens, these results document the success of policy over the past quarter century.
An interesting topic for future research is to understand how the change in the term sturcture of inflation uncertainty is related to the reduction in short-run uncertainty about real activity. Was monetary better because the real shocks were smaller or was there less real volatility because inflation was brought under control?
The success of the DFM framework is encouraging because it suggests that we may be able to identify fundamental shocks and test both empirical and theoretical propositions about how the Fed should react to incoming information. For example, it will be interesting to learn whether these factors that help predict inflation also help predict real interest rates. The New Keynesian literature is developing an extensive array of theoretical results about how policy should react to particular shocks. It will be interesting to see if the DFM framework can be used to identify such shocks and test those theories. All models included a constant and 12 lags of the inflation rate All models included a constant and 12 lags of the inflation rate 
